Economists studying the effects of the law on the consumer bankruptcy filing decision generally look at statutes limiting the enforcement of judgments. Typically, the focus is on exemptions of assets in bankruptcy (the level of the homestead exemption and other property exemptions) or limitations on creditors' ability to seize property or garnish wages in state courts prior to bankruptcy. This article examines another set of laws that could play an equally important effect on the bankruptcy decision: laws that regulate aggressive non-judicial debt collection.
Many creditors rely heavily on non-judicial debt collection techniques such as dunning letters and telephone calls to debtors, foregoing the legal process altogether.
Bankruptcy rarely serves as a means of collection for general unsecured creditors; fewer than five percent of Chapter 7 cases have non-exempt assets available for distribution (Flynn, Burke and Hazard, 2004) . Creditors do collect in state court, but the use of courts to collect consumer debt varies tremendously by state (Hynes, 2008) . Moreover, even in the most litigious states many creditors choose not to sue. For example, Virginia has one of the highest civil filing rates in the country, and consumer debt collections account for a substantial majority of the over seven hundred thousand civil filings that its general district courts receive in a typical year (Hynes, 2008) . These civil filings dwarf the fewer than twenty-eight thousand consumer bankruptcy filings made in Virginia in 2008. However, evidence from the payday lending industry suggests that they represent a small fraction of creditors' collection efforts.
1 Lawsuits may also be declining in importance as a means of 1 We do not know how often most creditors sue when their debtor fails to pay, but Virginia's Corporation collecting debts. The rate of civil litigation has remained fairly stable over the last thirty years, and the evidence suggests that the change in rate of consumer debt collection litigation has not matched the generally upward trend of consumer borrowing or the bankruptcy filing rate (Hynes, 2008) .
The fact that creditors do not sue does not mean that they do not try to collect. Either they or third-party debt collectors will use telephone calls, dunning letters and variety of other non-judicial debt collection techniques to try to convince the debtor to pay. The pressure on the debtor may be severe, and may often be enough to cause a debtor to choose bankruptcy. Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook (1989) find that about two-thirds of bankrupt debtors file before they are sued, and Stanley & Girth (1971) found similar results a generation ago.
At least some of the non-judicial collection techniques employed by creditors and their agents can be fairly described as aggressive, if not harassing or abusive, and the law tries to limit this conduct. For example, the New York State Attorney General's office recently obtained a court order to shut down a Buffalo-area debt collection operation.
Employees were alleged to have routinely impersonated police officers, threatening to arrest consumers and throw them in jail unless they made arrangements to pay the company immediately. 2 In more common incidents, collectors threaten debtors that if they are successfully sued and do not pay, they may be jailed; and collectors telephone debtors at their workplace, knowing that the employer does not permit such contacts. Section III uses the existence of these anti-harassment statutes and county-level bankruptcy data to reexamine one of the most commonly-asked questions in the consumer finance literature: whether differences in the law affect the consumer's bankruptcy filing decision. Anti-harassment laws may reduce the pressure that creditors can exert on a consumer in default, and they may therefore reduce the demand for bankruptcy protection.
We find that counties in states without anti-harassment statutes have average bankruptcy filing rates that are twelve to nineteen percent higher than counties in states that do. This effect remains statistically and economically significant in a wide variety of regressions using county-level data.
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Regressions that use aggregate bankruptcy filing rates could confound several effects because, in addition to the direct effects discussed above, anti-harassment laws may have several indirect effects on the bankruptcy filing rate. Anti-harassment laws may reduce the cost of default and thereby increase the number of defaults, and some of these additional defaults could ultimately lead to bankruptcy. To the extent that these laws reduce the ability of a creditor to collect, they may also reduce the supply of credit. If this results in lower debt burdens, it may ultimately lead to fewer bankruptcies. Ideally one would use individual repayment records to separate these three effects, and Section IV uses data from individual credit card accounts to do just this. Section IV finds that defaulting credit-card holders who live in states with anti-harassment laws are more likely to become -informally bankrupt.‖
5
Informal bankruptcy is a term that describes borrowers who have defaulted, but who have not filed for formal bankruptcy protection. At the same time, borrowers in these states are less likely to file for bankruptcy. We find that the thought experiment of moving a borrower from a state without an anti-harassment law to a state with an anti-harassment law increases the likelihood of informal bankruptcy by 14%, and decreases the likelihood of formal bankruptcy by 15%. These results, taken together, strongly suggest that anti-harassment laws 4 A previous version of this article found statistically significant results using state-level data.
5 Two prior articles have examined informal bankruptcy using proprietary data from credit card issuers. Dawsey & Ausubel (2001) studied the phenomenon of consumer default without any accompanying bankruptcy filing and coined the term -informal bankruptcy.‖ They documented its occurrence and explained its frequency using proprietary data of a national credit card issuer. Agarwal, et al (2003) S. 350 (1977) ). The literature fails to clearly establish that any of these changes increased the bankruptcy filing rate. Some studies found a statistically significant break in the filing rate around 1978 (Shepard, 1984; Peterson & Aoki, 1984; Boyes & Faith, 1986) , while others did not (Bhandari & Weiss, 1993; Domowitz and Eovaldi, 1993) . In any case, it would be difficult to attribute the continued rise in bankruptcy filings to legal changes that occurred a generation ago.
One of the main reasons that the 1978 Act was thought to have increased the incentive for consumer bankruptcy filings was that it introduced new federal, bankruptcyonly exemptions that were more generous than the exemptions previously available in many states. Nevertheless, about two-thirds of the states had opted out of the federal exemptions 7 We do not mean to suggest that the law has no effect on the bankruptcy filing rate. BAPCPA demonstrated that, at least in the short-run, the law clearly matters.
within four or five years (Hynes, Malani & Posner, 2004) , and so it is unclear if this change had much practical significance. This change may, however, have increased academic interest in property exemptions. These exemptions vary dramatically from state to state, and a number of scholars have examined whether differences in these exemptions help to explain differences in the filing rates across states.
8
On balance, the literature does not suggest a strong link between property exemptions and the bankruptcy filing rate. One early study found that exemptions increase the filing rate, but the estimated effect was small. (White (1987) ; see also Edmiston (2007) .) A number of other studies found either no statistically significant effect or even a negative relationship. (Apilado, Dauten & Smith (1978) There are a number of possible explanations for these results. First, the studies measured the effect of marginal differences in exemptions, and the marginal differences may have been relevant for very few debtors. For a consumer with no home or no home equity the difference between a $100,000 or even $10,000 homestead exemption and an -unlimited‖ exemption is meaningless. Second, these studies suffer from the standard problem of omitted variable bias. For example, most prior studies were unable to control for the amount of consumer debt in each state. If the exemptions reduce the ability of a creditor to collect, they may have made creditors less willing to lend (Gropp, Scholz & White (1997) ). Consumers with less access to debt should be less likely to file for bankruptcy. Third, states with a high bankruptcy filing rate may choose to adopt lower exemptions. We try to address this simultaneity bias by using homestead exemptions from 1920 as an instrument for current homestead exemptions.
A third, and more serious, problem is that most exemptions protect the debtor both inside and outside bankruptcy (i.e. most exemptions also apply to actions in state court), and thus they do not necessarily make bankruptcy relatively more attractive. We should model the consumer's decision as between three choices: repayment, formal bankruptcy filing, and -informal bankruptcy‖ (simply defaulting, without seeking the protections of bankruptcy court). Two existing papers use proprietary credit card repayment data to model this decision: Dawsey & Ausubel (2001) and Agarwal, et al (2003) . Even though many exemptions protect consumers who choose informal bankruptcy, each paper finds that generous exemptions increase the willingness of consumers to make a formal bankruptcy filing.
These two papers also find that restrictions on non-bankruptcy collections affect the bankruptcy filing rate. Specifically, they find that laws that limit the amount of wages that a creditor can garnish in state court reduce the bankruptcy filing rate. These laws reduce the cost of -informal bankruptcy‖ -simply refusing to pay -and thus make bankruptcy relatively less attractive. A number of prior studies that use aggregate level data also find that laws that restrict wage garnishment reduce bankruptcy filings (Apilado, Dauten & Smith (1978) , Ellis (1998) , Heck (1981) , Lefgren & McIntyre (2009) . But see Bhandari & Weiss (1993) .
When evaluating -informal bankruptcy‖ we should not, however, confine ourselves to laws that determine the amount that a creditor can collect in state court. The civil filing rate is roughly the same today as it was a generation ago, and there is no evidence suggesting that the amount of consumer debt collection in state courts has grown appreciably, despite the considerable growth in consumer indebtedness and bankruptcy (Hynes (2008) ). In contrast to the stable civil litigation rate, consumer debt collections appear to have increased substantially as creditors may have turned to non-judicial debt collection techniques such as dunning letters and telephone calls. The laws that regulate this conduct are described in the next section.
The Regulation of Non-Judicial Debt Collection
This article measures the impact of differences in state statutes that regulate nonjudicial debt collection. However, these statutes comprise just a portion of the law regulating this conduct. Any discussion of the regulation of non-judicial debt collection should begin with the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. Some provisions of the FDCPA regulate collection in state courts (judicial debt collection), 9 but this article focuses on those provisions that limit non-judicial collection efforts. The FDCPA gives the consumer the right to demand that the collector stop non-judicial collection efforts entirely. Even absent such a consumer request, the FDCPA prohibits communications at an unusual time or place such as after 9 p.m. at night or at the consumer's place of employment if the collector has reason to know that the employer prohibits these contacts. In addition, the FDCPA limits contacts with third parties and prohibits -harassment or abuse,‖ -false or misleading misrepresentations,‖ and -unfair practices.‖ The FDCPA provides for both administrative enforcement and private rights of action to enforce these provisions. The large amount of law regulating non-judicial debt collection does not imply that collection is prohibitively costly or even that abusive techniques are effectively prohibited.
The debt collection industry is enormous, implying that collectors have found some way to navigate the law. In addition, the private rights of action will do little good unless a consumer knows of the law and can find a lawyer willing to take the case. As a result, it is not clear that we should expect the anti-harassment laws to have a significant effect on consumer behavior.
Analysis of Anti-Harassment Statutes Using County-Level Data
Anti-harassment statutes may help to protect the consumer against aggressive collection techniques. To the extent that they do, they should be expected to reduce the benefit of filing for bankruptcy -as the relief provided by the automatic stay is diminished -and therefore the incidence of bankruptcy . This section uses aggregate data to test whether these anti-harassment laws reduce bankruptcy filing rates. The next section then uses individual data to address some confounding effects.
Data and Variables
This section tests the effect of anti-harassment statutes using 2008 county-level bankruptcy filing rates (filings per 100,000 people). We define a dummy variable (Harassment) that equals one if the county is in a state with a statute that provides a private right of action against a harassing or abusive creditor. Twenty-three states have enacted such laws; these states are indicated in Table 2 . 10 We also control for a number of other legal limits on debt-collection. Federal law limits wage garnishment by general creditors to the lesser of twenty-five percent of the consumer's income or the amount by which the consumer's weekly take-home pay exceeds thirty times the federal minimum wage, but states may protect more of a debtor's wages. We define a dummy variable, Garnishment, that equals one for counties in states that protect more than seventy-five percent of debtors' income from garnishment. 11 Seventeen states have enacted such laws; these states are also indicated in Table 2 . Months to foreclose is HUD's estimate (measured in months) of how long it should take a diligent creditor to foreclosure on a home mortgage.
10 This measure has the advantage of simplicity, but it ignores the possibility of close substitutes in the form of the common law tort theories discussed above. Nearly every state has some form of these theories, but the ability of a plaintiff to use them will depend on judicial interpretations that are extremely difficult to code. We generated a measure of the availability of these common law measures to test our results for robustness.
Although the sign of the coefficient remained the same, the coefficient was no longer statistically significant.
11 Alternatively, we could have identified states that prohibit the garnishment of the wages of a head of household without the consumer's consent or states that protect more than thirty times the federal minimum wage. See infra Table 2 . These alternative specifications do not materially affect our results. This is not a paper about property exemptions. However, because of the large number of earlier studies that offer conflicting results (and in order to avoid omitting a variable that is potentially significant), we report the results for a few different specifications of the exemption variables. Homestead exemption represents the dollar limit on the homestead exemption available in a state, and Personal exemption represents the dollar limit on exemptions that can be applied to cash or motor vehicles. Some states provide no dollar limit on exemptions, and so we cap these exemptions at the highest observed dollar limit for that type of property. If exemptions have any effect, the effect should be non-linear:
the difference between a $10,000 exemption and a $20,000 exemption should be far more important than the difference between a $510,000 exemption and a $520,000 exemption. We therefore include both the value of the exemption and the square of the value of the exemption in most specifications, the log of the exemptions in one specification, and we divided the exemptions into quartiles in another. We also tried to control for the endogeneity of exemptions by using homestead exemptions from 1920 as an instrument for current law.
As discussed below, none of these alternative specifications materially affected our results.
We also control for a series of economic and demographic variables including the percent of households in various income categories, the unemployment rate in the prior year, the median home value in the county, race, the percent of the population with a high school education, the percent of the population without health insurance, the percent of the population over fifteen that is divorced and the crime rate. In one specification we also control for the percent of filings made in Chapter 13 as these filings usually do not result in a discharge, and others have argued that counties with high percentage of bankruptcies in chapter 13 have artificially inflated filing rates (Lefgren & McIntyre (2009) 
Results
The first three columns of Table 3 present regressions of the log of the 2008 filing rate. The regressions suggest that counties in states with anti-harassment laws have significantly lower bankruptcy filing rates even after controlling for a host of other factors.
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The coefficient on the harassment variable is robust to the inclusion of other explanatory variables (see the alternative specifications in columns (1) - (3) of Table 3 ), to the use of the bankruptcy filing rate instead of its log (see column (4) of Table 3) , and even to the use of pre-BAPCPA (2004) bankruptcy filing rates (see column (5) of Table 3 ). The estimated magnitude of the relationship is relatively large. Our estimates suggest that the presence of an anti-harassment statute may reduce the bankruptcy filing rate by between twelve and nineteen percent.
We cannot offer direct evidence that consumers use these anti-harassment statutes with any regularity or that concerns about liability under these statutes restrains creditors from engaging in aggressive collections efforts. We recognize that the measured effect of the anti-harassment laws may be due to omitted variables that are correlated with these laws; for example, the anti-harassment statute may serve as a proxy for debtor protections more 12 Given the large number of papers that try to explain the bankruptcy filing rate, we will not dwell on the coefficients for most of our variables. However, we note in passing that the negative and significant coefficient on garnishment is consistent with the prior literature, as is the lack of support for the claim that large property exemptions increase the filing rate. We continue to find this lack of support when we use historic exemptions (1920) as a proxy for current laws.
generally. Panel data would allow us to better control for these omitted variables, but these laws appear to change infrequently. We compared the summary of these laws in the 1987 volume of the National Consumer Law Center's publication of Fair Debt Collection to the summary in the 2008 volume, and there appeared to be no more than four significant changes in state law.
Analysis of Anti-Harassment Statutes Using Individual Data
We have posited that anti-harassment statutes, by reducing the aggressiveness of creditors' collections efforts, would reduce the benefit of consumer bankruptcy filings.
Moreover, in the previous section, we found the empirical result (consistent with this mechanism) that bankruptcy filing rates were significantly lower in jurisdictions with antiharassment statutes. Our point of departure for the current section is to observe that the same logic which led to reductions in -formal‖ bankruptcies should also imply increases in -informal‖ bankruptcies. That is, if anti-harassment statutes reduce the aggressiveness of collections efforts and thereby reduce the probability that an individual files for bankruptcy, conditional on defaulting on a debt, then these laws would also be likely to increase the probability that an individual remains in default (but without an accompanying bankruptcy filing).
Unlike formal bankruptcy statistics, which are compiled by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, there are no official statistics collected on -informal bankruptcy.‖ However, in this section, we are able to utilize a proprietary dataset from a large credit card issuer to examine the question. We use individual-level cardholder data to test whether these laws both reduce the probability that a defaulting individual files for bankruptcy and increase the probability that an individual will remain in default without filing for bankruptcy.
Data and Variables
The dataset we use in this section includes variables, generated by a large U.S. credit card issuer, describing nearly 50,000 pre-approved gold card recipients. The bank collected the data from respondents to three sets of solicitations mailed between 1995 and 1997. The data was originally obtained for studying adverse selection in connection with credit card offers (see Ausubel (1999) ). As such, it includes variables describing the terms of the solicitation, including the introductory interest rate and its duration. It also contains detailed variables from the respondents' credit histories, such as their credit scores, obtained from a credit bureau at the time of solicitation. Finally, the dataset includes variables describing the subsequent use of the gold card, including the amount of borrowing and whether a default or bankruptcy occurs, obtained from tracking each account for several years. We used the borrowers' zip codes to match the credit card data to the state-and county-level information described in the previous section, including our measures of exemptions, garnishment laws, and anti-harassment statutes.
The outcome measure specifies a borrower's choice among three options:
Repayment, bankruptcy, and informal bankruptcy. The lender recorded whether the borrower filed a formal bankruptcy, and we categorized a borrower as informally bankruptcy if she was charged off for long term delinquency (usually after six months).
The borrower is assumed to choose among her options according to which yields the highest utility. The stochastic component of her utility function is assumed to follow an extreme-value distribution. This error structure yields a multinomial logit, so that the probability of outcome k is given by:
The subscripts R, I, and F refer to the outcomes of repayment, informal bankruptcy, and formal bankruptcy, respectively. The coefficient estimates are not readily interpretable, and therefore the average marginal effects will be presented and discussed. Table 4 reports the average marginal effect of the explanatory variables on the probability that a borrower will repay, file for bankruptcy or choose informal bankruptcy.
Results
The results are most readily interpreted by considering the thought experiment of moving a borrower from a state without an anti-harassment law to a state with an anti-harassment law.
The coefficient on the harassment variable implies that, all other things being equal, a move to an anti-harassment state decreases the likelihood of a formal bankruptcy filing by around 0.21 percentage points (see column (3) of Table 4 ). Since the baseline probability of a bankruptcy filing in our data set is 1.42%, a reduction of 0.21% implies a decline in the bankruptcy filing rate of 15% in anti-harassment states. This is consistent with our estimate using county-level data in Section III. The same move to an anti-harassment state would also increase the likelihood of informal bankruptcy by around 0.17 percentage points, implying an increase in the informal bankruptcy rate of 14%. The implied increase of informal bankruptcy obviously cannot be compared with any official statistics, but is consistent with our earlier prediction. The results in all specifications that we considered indicate that living in a state with anti-harassment statutes reduces the likelihood that a borrower will choose to file for bankruptcy and increases the likelihood that she will choose to remain in informal bankruptcy. Meanwhile, our estimates do not yield a statistically-significant relationship between the presence of anti-harassment laws and the overall rate of repayment.
Conclusion
Non-judicial debt collection is a huge and growing industry. The growth in debt collections has been matched by a growth in complaints; the FTC receives more complaints about debt collectors than complaints about any other industry (almost twenty percent of all complaints). (Federal Trade Commission, 2007) . Several layers of law (federal and state, statutory and common law) regulate debt collection activity, and this article has tried to measure the impact of one of these layers -state statutes that give the consumer a private right of action against an overly aggressive creditor. This article has found that states with anti-harassment statutes have significantly lower bankruptcy filing rates than states without these laws, but that the reduction in official bankruptcy statistics conceals an offsetting increase of -informal bankruptcy‖ by individuals who live in these states. The net effect of these laws on repayment is not statistically significant.
The estimated impact of the harassment variable was large. By way of comparison, in our estimates based on individual data, the marginal effect of an anti-harassment statute on both formal and informal bankruptcies was the same order of magnitude as the marginal effect of a state law limiting garnishment. In our regressions based on county-level 2004 bankruptcy filings, the measured effect of the harassment variable was the same as that of the garnishment variable, while in our regressions based on county-level 2008 filings, the measured effect of the harassment variable was about half that of the garnishment variable.
These empirical results are surprisingly robust, but they do not tell us whether states should enact anti-harassment laws. First, the measured effects could be due not to the laws, but to omitted variables that are correlated with the presence of these laws. Second, even if these laws do have a direct effect on bankruptcy and repayment, their desirability is ambiguous. Anti-harassment laws could deter legitimate collection efforts and make it too easy for consumers to avoid paying debts without incurring the costs of bankruptcy or the scrutiny of the courts. On the other hand, these laws may allow defaulting consumers some extra breathing room before filing for bankruptcy, enabling some to recover financially and to be able to repay their debts in full. In addition, society may want to allow some consumers to default without filing for bankruptcy because of the expense of the bankruptcy process.
Finally, society may want to force creditors to go to court to prove their claims, in order to minimize collection activity against consumers who do not actually owe the alleged debts. In any event, our results do suggest that anti-harassment laws may have a significant impact on how aggressively creditors collect their debts through non-judicial methods, and they suggest that if the pressure of non-judicial debt collection is reduced, bankruptcy filings will less frequently occur. 
